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LEGITIMIZING PRIVATE PLACEMENT
BROKER-DEALERS WHO DEAL WITH
PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS: A
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW REGULATORY
REGIME AND A LIMITED EXCEPTION TO
REGISTRATION
ROBERT CONNOLLY*

I.

THE PROBLEM WITH UNREGISTERED FINDERS AND FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES IN SECURITIES OFFERINGS

Before you speak, listen. Before you write, think. Before you spend,
earn. Before you invest, investigate. Before you criticize, wait.
Before you pray, forgive. Before you quit, try. Before you retire, save.
1
Before you die, give.

Protecting investors and preserving the integrity of the
securities markets are the primary duties of the federal securities
laws and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC").2 Investments in securities are not provided the same
guarantees as certain bank deposits, thus, investors must perform
the proper due diligence and ask the right questions in order to
protect their investments. 3 Congress enacted the Securities Act of
1933" ("Securities Act") to ensure "full and fair" disclosure is made
to investors as to the character of certain offered securities.' All
investors,
from
private
individuals,
to
sophisticated

J.D., The John Marshall Law School,
2007.
1. Nonstop English, William A. Ward Quotations, http://www.nonstop
english.com/reading/quotations/A-William-Al-Ward.asp (last visited Apr. 16,
2007).
2. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate:
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter The Investor's Advocate] (providing history and
overview of SEC and securities laws).
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
5. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
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businesspersons, to large organizations, are entitled to disclosure
of this information.6
Many investors, rather than dealing directly with the issuer
of securities, will utilize brokers or dealers to facilitate the
transaction. Thus, Congress enacted the U.S. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934' ("Exchange Act") to regulate securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets and to prevent unfair practices by the
participants within those exchanges and markets. 8 The Exchange
Act, by regulating the activities of brokers and dealers, is an
important safeguard for investors and the securities market. In
recent years, however, the good intentions of the Exchange Act
have created obstacles to raising capital for smaller issuers
because of the strict regulations imposed on broker-dealers. 9
Many broker-dealers will not work with smaller issuers offering
under twenty-five million dollars 0 because there is no financial
incentive for the broker-dealer."
Therefore, smaller issuers
sometimes seek out so-called unregistered finders and financial
intermediaries to assist them in finding investors." This activity
both places the issuer and its investors at a heightened risk" and
creates confusion as to how these finders and intermediaries fit
into the current regulatory system.
As a result, one of the top issues in securities law facing small
and mid-size issuers, as well as securities professionals, is the lack
of clear guidance from the SEC regarding finders and other
intermediaries in securities transactions, particularly private
placements. 4 Under the current SEC rules and regulations, as
6. See The Investor's Advocate, supra note 2 (explaining that all investors
should have a right to certain basic information about a security before
making a decision to purchase).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).

8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291; 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000)).
9. See Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, ABA Section of
Business Law, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Private
Placement Broker-Dealers, 60 BUS. LAW. 959, 968 (2005) [hereinafter ABA

Report] (noting that most registered brokerage firms are reluctant to get
involved in offerings under twenty-five million dollars).

10. Id.
11. Id. at 968 (stating that brokerage firms make this decision mostly for
economic reasons). These firms simply do not have the incentive to get
involved with smaller offerings because, among other reasons, the risk of
doing a small deal is usually the same as doing a large one that pays a larger

commission. Id.
12. See id. at 960 (explaining that a finder or financial intermediary

typically is an individual who brings together an issuer and investor). The
finder or intermediary may take part in the negotiations and receive
transaction-based compensation if the investor subscribes to the offering. Id.
13. See infra notes 17-21.
14. See 22ND ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, FINAL REPORT, 14-17 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
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well as those of the states, many of these finders and
intermediaries are actually unregistered broker-dealers. 5 This is
the case even if all parties involved in the transaction are highly
sophisticated, wealthy, experienced, and accredited investors
engaging in a private offering exempt from registration. s
Registration as a broker-dealer is a burdensome and timeconsuming process that requires ongoing reporting and compliance
throughout the year. 17 The unregistered broker-dealer faces
penalties i" and possible civil19 and criminal0 liability for failing to
register, and investors may seek to void their investment and seek
rescission.' Thus, even though a finder or financial intermediary
is neither a full-fledged broker-dealer nor ever intends to engage
in traditional broker-dealer activities, the current regulatory
system treats that individual as such.
Recognizing this problem, the 2003 Government-Business
Forum on Small Business Capital Formation ("Forum")
recommended that the SEC address the issue of unregistered
finders and intermediaries.2 Subsequently, in 2005 a special task
FINAL
REPORT],
available at
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor22.pdf
(discussing the top securities regulation recommendations made by forum
participants); see also HUGH H. MAKENS, CAPITAL FORMATION: MAKING
"FINDERS" VIABLE 1 (2004), available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/
hmakens (explaining the problem with the current regulatory regime); 23RD
ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUsINEss FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL
FORMATION, FINAL REPORT 7-8 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FINAL REPORT],
available at www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor23.pdf (setting agenda for the
23rd Annual Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation).
15. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 960 (discussing activities of "finders");
see also MAKENS, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that, under the current rules,
most of the activities of finders and intermediaries fall within the definition of
a broker-dealer and would require the individual to register).
16. MAKENS, supra note 14, at 7.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3 to a-5 (2006); see also
A.A. SOMMER, JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 3.03-.04
(2005) (discussing reporting and recordkeeping requirements for registered
broker-dealers).
18. SOMMER, supra note 17, § 3.03.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2000); see also SOMMER, supra note 17, at n.13
(citing Eastside Church of Christ v. Nat'l Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.
1968)).
22. 2003 FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 14-15.
The Forum's
recommendations stated that the SEC should: (i) adopt specific regulations for
finders and other intermediaries; (ii) assist in finding the proper function of
finders in capital-raising activities; and (iii) set forth the instances in which
such individuals may be compensated. Id.
The 2004 and 2005 Forums
reiterated these same suggestions, with the 2005 Forum suggesting that the
SEC use the ABA Report as a starting point for creating a regulatory regime
for private placement broker-dealers. 2004 FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 910; 24TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS
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force within the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Section of
Business Law published a report ("ABA Report") regarding socalled "private placement broker-dealers."'
The ABA Report
urged the SEC to establish a simplified registration process for
private placement broker-dealers.'
The ABA Report also
identified certain minimum criteria that private placement brokerdealers should meet in order to qualify for simplified registration,
including that the private placement broker-dealer restrict its
participation to private offerings involving accredited investors
and qualified purchasers, as defined by the SEC.25
The ABA Report, however, did not address the roles of the
suitability doctrine or of sophisticated investors. Further, it did
not discuss private investment funds, which are a subcategory of
private offerings and typically involve sophisticated, accredited
investors on all sides of the transaction. 26
Therefore, this
Comment will examine the current broker-dealer regulatory
regime and suitability doctrine as they pertain to private
CAPITAL FORMATION, FINAL REPORT 14 (2005), avialable at http://www.

sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor24.pdf.
Furthermore, the transcript of the 2004 Forum reveals discussions
among participants regarding the problem of unregistered finders and
financial intermediaries.
Transcript of 23rd Annual SEC GovernmentBusiness Forum on Small Business Capital Formation at 91-92, 97 (Sept. 20,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/transcript.pdf [hereinafter
"Forum Transcript"]. Brian A. Bussey, Assistant Chief Counsel of the SEC
Division of Market Regulation, remarked that his division recognizes the
problem of unregistered finders and financial intermediaries and stated that
"the possibility of lesser regulation ... really is a possibility." Id. at 91. He
noted, however, that embarking on such a massive undertaking would require
a lot of review of various regulatory systems, including the SEC, the NASD,
and the states. Id. at 91-92. He also requested more specificity with respect
to the problems faced by finders, intermediaries, and practitioners in order to
properly address the issue and balance the interests of both investors and
issuers. Id. at 91-92, 97.
23. ABA Report, supra note 9, at 959.
The ABA Report provides a
comprehensive overview of the issue regarding unregistered finders and other
intermediaries, especially within the realms of private placements and
mergers and acquisitions. Id.
24. Id. at 961-62.
25. Id.
The specific criteria set forth by the ABA Report were: (i) the
private placement broker-dealer cannot participate in public offerings, but
may receive referral fees from full-fledged broker-dealers in such offerings; (ii)
statutory disqualifications will not apply to the private placement brokerdealer or its principals; (iii) private placement broker-dealers may only make
offerings to accredited investors and qualified purchasers; (iv) private
placement broker-dealers may not hold or possess funds or securities; (v)
offerings will be done on a "best efforts basis"; (vi) funds from the offerings will
be held in an unaffiliated escrow account; (vii) the private placement brokerdealer may not participate in trading activity; (viii) principals and
representatives of the private placement broker-dealer must complete certain
NASD exams developed specifically for private placement broker-dealers. Id.
26. See infra text accompanying note 39.

20071

Legitimizing PrivatePlacementBroker-Dealers

placement broker-dealers involved with private investment funds
that make offerings solely to sophisticated, accredited investors in
exempt offerings. 7 It will demonstrate that the suitability doctrine
legitimizes the proposed regulatory regime for private placement
broker-dealers.
Part II of this Comment will overview private investment
funds, discuss the common exemptions to securities registration
utilized by these funds, discuss briefly the rules and regulations
pertaining to broker-dealers, including the suitability doctrine,
and review the main exemptions to broker-dealer registration.
Part III of this Comment will analyze how courts interpret
the statutory definition of the term "broker," discuss and analyze
the main exemptions to broker-dealer registration as they may
apply to private investment funds, discuss how some states have
approached the issue of regulating finders and other financial
intermediaries, and analyze the boundaries of the suitability
doctrine as applied to full-service broker-dealers and examine
whom the securities laws and courts consider sophisticated
investors, particularly with respect to private investment funds.
Finally, Part IV will suggest that the proposed new
regulations for private placement broker-dealers should include
subcategories allowing limited registration for certain types of
private placement broker-dealers, including a category for "private
investment
fund
representatives,"
recommend
National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) membership and limited
registrations for private investment fund representatives, discuss
the characteristics of these private investment fund private
placement broker-dealers, including the scope of their activities,
propose that the suitability doctrine and the sophistication of the
investors legitimize the suggestions made by the Forum and the
ABA Report (at least with respect to private investment funds),
and propose a limited exception to registration for certain private
placement broker-dealers involved in a limited number of
transactions involving accredited and sophisticated investors.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Private Investment Funds
Private investment funds ("Fund" or "Funds") are pooled
investment vehicles through which the Fund's investors and

27. The entire spectrum of activity of finders and financial intermediaries is
very large and beyond the scope of this Comment; thus, this discussion will
focus exclusively on finders and financial intermediaries in the realm of
private investment funds. Furthermore, the ABA Report discussed mergers
and acquisitions as well as private placements, generally, in connection with
its analysis. ABA Report, supra note 9, at 960.
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principals contractually agree on certain investment objectives.2
These Funds perform many roles in the capital and investment
markets, including providing venture capital to start-up
companies and capital formation to existing companies.2
The
Funds also function as investment vehicles through which
investors pool their capital under a common investment strategy. 30
There are several major categories of private investment funds, 3'
with each possessing a different investment strategy.n The
organization and structure of most Funds, however, is the same. 33
B. The Private Offering Exemption, Regulation D, and Rule 506
The offering of interests sold by most Funds are exempt from
SEC registration under the Securities Act" and Rule 506, under
Regulation D. 35 Rule 5063 provides that the offering of securities

is exempt from registration as long as there are thirty-five or
fewer "non-accredited" investors and that the offering complies
with the provisions of Rules 50137 and 502.3 Most Funds typically
28. See JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIvATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE
AND OPERATIONS § 1.02[1], at 1-8 (2005) (discussing private investment funds
in terms of "the private ordering of a financial intermediary relationship...
[whereby] the investors provide capital and the Principals, through the
General Partner, the Manager and the Fund, provide investment advice and
services").
29. See id. § 1.01, at 1-4 (discussing the role of private investment funds in
the United States).
30. Id.
31. See id. §1.02[2], at 1-10 (listing the following categories: "Venture
Capital Funds; Leveraged Buyout or Merchant Banking Funds; Hedge Funds;
Funds of Funds; Real Estate Funds; Captive Funds; and, Semi-Captive
Funds"). Given the myriad of investment strategies and amount of capital
among these funds, discussion will be limited to a generalized, broad definition
of private investment funds identified in supra note 28.
32. See id. (categorizing private investment funds).
33. See id. § 1.01, at 1-5 to -6. (discussing organization and structure of
private investment funds). Generally, the principals organize the Fund as a
Delaware limited partnership. Id. The general partner of the Fund is an
entity (usually a limited liability company) owned by one or more of the
principals. Id. Investors subscribe for and purchase limited partnership
interests of the Fund and enter into a partnership agreement with the general
partner. Id. The partnership agreement, inter alia, sets forth the capital
commitments for the general partner and investors, the investment strategy of
the Fund, and how the Fund will distribute profits. Id. The Fund, through
the general partner, uses the capital contributions to pay expenses and make
investments. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000). Pursuant to § 77d(2) of the Securities Act,
the registration provisions do not apply to "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering." Id.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006). Regulation D sets forth certain rules
promulgated by the SEC with respect to limited offerings.
36. Id.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2006). Rule 501 sets forth certain definitions,
including "accredited investor." An accredited investor includes certain
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only sell to accredited investors.39 Thus, the average investor in a
Fund is generally either a wealthy individual or entity that meets
the regulatory definition of an accredited investor. '
institutions, wealthy individuals, and trusts with high levels of assets. Id.
With respect to individuals, the person must either: (a) have a net worth
(either individually or jointly with their spouse) in excess of $1 million; or (b)
have an individual income in excess of $200,000, or joint income with their
spouse in excess of $300,000. Id. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6). Additionally, that person
must have attained that income in each of the previous two years, and that
person must have a reasonable expectation of attaining that same level of
income during the current year. Id. There is no limit on the number of
accredited investors that may participate in the offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
In January 2007, the SEC proposed a new category of accredited
investor, called an "Accredited Natural Person," that would apply to investors
in certain private investment vehicles. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private
Investment Vehicles 72 Fed. Reg. 400-01 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,
275). The proposed definition of Accredited Natural Person includes the Rule
506 requirements summarized above, as well as "a requirement that such
person also must own (individually, or jointly with the person's spouse) not
less than $2.5 million (as adjusted every five years for inflation) in
investments at the time of purchase of securities issued by private investment
vehicles under Regulation D or section 4(6)." Id. The SEC is attempting to
further protect investors raising the eligibility threshold for which investors
may participate in Funds. Id. This proposal, however, seems to be very
controversial judging by the number of negative comments left by people and
See U.S. Securities and Exchange
entities opposed to the new rule.
Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private
Investment Vehicles, http'//www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506.shtml
(containing public comments to proposed rule).
The other categories of accredited investors identified under 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(1) include: (i) banks and savings and loan associations; (ii)
registered broker-dealers; (iii) insurance companies; (iv) registered investment
companies; (v) certain public employment benefit plans with total assets of
more than five million dollars and certain other plans falling within the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; (vi) certain non-profit
organizations and business trusts with assets of more than five million dollars
that were not formed for the specific purpose of purchasing the offered
securities; (vii) the principals of the issuer; (viii) trusts that have total assets
greater than five million dollars that were not formed for the specific purpose
of purchasing the offered securities, and the purchase is directed by a
sophisticated person (as described in Rule 506(b)(2)(ii)); (ix) entities where all
equity owners are accredited investors. Id.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2006). Rule 502, inter alia, sets forth what
information issuers must provide to non-accredited investors. Id. It also
limits the amount of general advertising and solicitation, and states that the
investors may not re-sell their securities unless the securities are registered or
subject to another exemption. Id.
39. See SCHELL, supra note 28, § 8.01[2], at 8-7 (stating that most private
investment funds limit their offering to accredited investors for both
regulatory and business purposes).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501; see also supra text accompanying note 37
(providing regulatory definition and categories of accredited investors).
Sometimes, as in the case of a fund of funds, the investor is another private
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C. Broker-DealerRules and Regulations
1. Requirement of Registrationand Statutory Definition of
"Broker"and "Dealer"
The Exchange Act requires brokers and dealers who "effect
any transactions in, or... induce or attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security" to register with the SEC. 41 The
Exchange Act defines a broker as "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others."42 A dealer is "any person engaged in the business of
buying and selling securities for such person's own account
through a broker or otherwise."' However, a person who does not
buy and sell securities for his or her own account "as a part of a
regular business" is not a dealer under the Exchange Act."
Before a broker-dealer can conduct any regulated business, he
must: (i) file a Form BD (Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer
Registration) with the SEC, which must then be accepted by the
SEC; 45 (ii) join a self-regulatory organization (SRO); ' (iii) join the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC);4 1 (iv) comply
investment fund. See SCHELL, supra note 28, § 1.06[1l], at 1-32 (describing
"funds of funds").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)(2000).
42. Id. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
43. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
44. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(B). Oftentimes, the terms "broker" and "dealer" are used
together as "broker-dealer," regardless of the particular definition being used.
See David A. Lipton, Symposium on Securities Regulation:Article: A Primeron
Broker-DealerRegistration, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 899, 909-910 (1987) (providing
an overview of broker-dealer regulation, including definitions of brokers and
dealers). This Comment will use the term "broker-dealer" as a matter of
convenience. However, given that activities by the private placement brokerdealers are more commonly associated with that of a broker, analysis will
focus on the definition of a broker.
45. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Guide to Broker Dealer
Registration (2005), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Guide to Broker Dealer Registration]
(outlining the various registration steps and requirements for broker-dealers).
46. Id. A broker-dealer who effects securities transactions within one
national exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), generally
only has to be a member of that exchange. Id. However, if the broker-dealer
does not effect transactions on one of the national exchanges, or is involved in
transactions within different exchanges and over-the-counter, then that
broker-dealer will have to register with the NASD. Id.
47. Id. Registered broker-dealers pay membership dues to the SIPC. Id.
The SIPC, in turn, insures that those broker-dealers' customers will, in the
event the broker-dealer is liquidated, receive back their cash and securities up
to a certain amount. Id. The SIPC's website notes that:
When a brokerage firm is closed due to bankruptcy or other financial
difficulties and customer assets are missing, SIPC steps in as quickly as
possible and, within certain limits, works to return customers' cash,
stock and other securities. Without SIPC, investors at financially
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with the appropriate state rules and conditions;48 and (v) ensure
all associated persons of the broker-dealer are properly qualified.49
2.

The SuitabilityDoctrine

The suitability doctrine refers to the principle that a brokerdealer must only recommend securities that are suitable to a
customer, given that customer's investment objectives and
financial condition.5" The broker-dealer ascertains the customer's
investment objectives and financial condition based upon facts
disclosed by the customer to the broker-dealer." The SEC enforces
this principle through the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act, and the rules promulgated under those
Acts. 2
The NASD's Conduct Rule 2310 sets forth detailed
suitability requirements that member broker-dealers must follow
before recommending a security to a customer.53 The national
exchanges have similar, albeit less specific, rules that are
commonly referred to as the "know your customer rule."54
troubled brokerage firms might lose their securities or money forever or
wait for years while their assets are tied up in court.
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, The SIPC Mission, http://www.
sipc.org/who/sipcmission.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
48. Guide to Broker Dealer Registration, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. See Charles R. Mills & Ronald A. Holinsky, Customer Transactions:
Suitability, Unauthorized Trading, and Churning, in BROKER-DEALER
REGULATION 6-1, 6-2 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2004) (discussing the suitability
doctrine under securities law).
51. Id.
52. Id. For example, Rule 10b-5 states that a registered person, in
connection with the purchase and sale of a security, cannot utilize devices or
schemes to commit fraud, fail to disclose material facts, make untrue
statements, or engage in fraudulent acts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
53. National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Manual § 2310
(2005), http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html [hereinafter NASD
Manual] (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). The NASD rule requires that, when a
member broker-dealer makes a recommendation to a customer, that brokerdealer "shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation
is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by
such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs." Id. In addition, the broker-dealer must also "make
reasonable efforts" to acquire information about the financial and tax status of
their customer, the investment objectives of their customer, and any other
information the member broker-dealer may consider reasonable in order to
make a recommendation. Id.
54. See Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fraud, in 3 SECURITIES REGULATION
3547, 3846-48 (Aspen 2004) (1951) (discussing the suitability doctrine and the
rules of the various exchanges). The NYSE's rule states that every member of
the Exchange must "[u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer."
New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Rules, Rule 405,
http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp-1-5&
manual=/nyse/nyse-rules/nyse-rules/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
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D. Exemptions to Broker-DealerRegistration
The two main exemptions to the broker-dealer registration
requirement are the Rule 3a4-1 "safe harbor" for associated
persons of an issuer 5 and the limited exemption for "finders" who
bring potential investors and issuers together."
1.

Rule 3a4-1 Safe-Harborfor Associated Persons of Issuers

The safe-harbor exemption, on a very limited basis, allows an
associated person of an issuer to effect securities transactions
In short, that person cannot: (i) be
without registration.57
The American Stock Exchange has a similar rule: "Every member or
member organization shall use due diligence to learn the essential facts
American Stock Exchange, AMEX
relative to every customer .... "
Constitutin and Rules, Rule 411, httpJ/wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/
PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp-l_2&manual=/AMEX/rules/amexrules/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2003).
56. See 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 19:3

(Jason Conklin et al., eds., West 2006) (1977) (discussing exceptions to brokerdealer registration).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1. The safe-harbor rule states that an associated
person of an issuer must first meet all three of the following conditions: (i) at
the time of their participation in the offering, the person is not subject to any
statutory disqualification pursuant to § 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act, id.
§ 240.3a4-1(a)(1); (ii) the person does not receive, either directly or indirectly,
transaction-based compensation, id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(2); and, (iii) the person is
not an associated person of a broker-dealer at the time of his or her
participation with the offering, id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(3).
If the associated person meets those initial three conditions, that person
must then meet one of three additional conditions. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4). The
first condition limits that person's participation either (1) to offerings and
sales made to certain institutions; (2) to exempt securities as defined by
§§ 3(a)(7), 3(a)(9), or 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act; or (3) to securities as part of
a reorganization, merger, consolidation, transfer of assets, or other similar
acquisition in exchange for securities of the issuer. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(i).
With respect to the last circumstance, the security holders must have
consented to the transaction. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(i)(C). In addition, the
associated person may offer securities in connection with a pension, profit
sharing, or other comparable employee profit sharing or dividend
reinvestment plan. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(i)(D).
The second condition is that if the associated person's substantial duties
on behalf of the issuer are or will be unrelated to the transaction at issue, that
person was neither a registered broker-dealer nor associated with one within
the past twelve months, and the associated person does not participate in a
securities transaction more than once every twelve months. Id. § 240.3a41(a)(4)(ii). With respect to the last requirement, however, there is an exception
for those employee-benefit offerings for providing basic, ministerial duties, and
for responding to investor inquiries regarding an offering. Id. § 240.3a41(a)(4)(ii)(C). An associated person may partake in these activities more than
once every twelve months. Id.
The third condition is that the activities of the associated person are
restricted to primarily clerical and ministerial work involving the offering. Id.
§ 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(iii).
This can include preparing or delivering written
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transaction-based
(ii) receive
by
statute;'
disqualified
compensation; 9 and, (iii) be associated with a registered brokerdealer at the time of the participation.' In addition, that person
must meet other conditions that limit his or her involvement to
either certain limited investors,6 1 certain exempted securities,62 or
certain limited activities."
2.

Finder'sExemption

The Exchange Act does not explicitly set forth an exemption
for finders. Rather, the finder's exemption is limited to narrow
circumstances as set forth in a collection of SEC no-action letters
granted pursuant to the exemptive authority of the Exchange
Act." Generally, this exemption is limited to those who introduce
investors to issuers, but who do not take part in the negotiations
and do not receive commission or compensation relative to the size
of the transaction.6
Given the Forum's findings,' the ABA Report," as well as
comments from at least one SEC representative,' the current
broker-dealer regulatory system is not appropriate for private
placement broker-dealers, and a less restrictive, "lighter" regime is
necessary. In order to determine the boundaries of a possible new
regulatory regime, especially with respect to the suitability
doctrine, it is necessary first to analyze how courts interpret the
statutory definition of "broker" and second to analyze the current

communication as long as that does not involve solicitation of a potential
purchaser and so long as a principal of the issuer approves the content of the
communication. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(A). Further, the associated person
may respond to purchaser-initiated inquiries regarding the offering. Id.
However, the response must be limited to the
§ 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(B).
information found in the registration statement or offering documents. Id.
58. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(1).
59. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(2).
60. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(3).
61. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(i).
62. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii).
63. Id. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(iii).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a) (2000). With the exception of certain provisions in
the Exchange Act regarding government securities, the SEC may "by rule,
regulation, or order.., conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person,
security, or transaction, or any class [thereof from registration and regulation]
to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors." Id.
65. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 56, § 19:3.
66. See 2003 FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 14-19 (explaining the
problem with the present regulatory system as applied to certain finders and
intermediaries and proposing certain solutions).
67. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 961-62 (proposing relaxed regulatory
regime for private placement broker-dealers).
68. See Forum Transcript, supra note 22, at 91-92, 97 (noting that a relaxed
regulatory regime for certain finders or intermediaries is possible).
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apply to private

III. ANALYSIS
A.

The FederalRegulatory Regime

The primary purpose and goal of the Exchange Act is investor
protection.69 Therefore, any changes to the existing regulatory
system must not conflict with the SEC's mission.7 °
1.

Definition of Broker

As noted, the Exchange Act defines a broker as "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others." 71 There are three required criteria within
this definition: (1) "engaged in the business"; (2) "effecting
transactions in securities"; and (3) "for the account of others." The
first two criteria have received the most analysis by courts and
commentators.
a.

"Engaged in the Business"

The Exchange Act does not define this phrase; rather, its
definition comes from case law and SEC no-action letters. 2 An
essential element in determining whether one is "engaged in the
business" is the "regularity of participation" in securities
transactions. 3 In discussing various rulings and SEC no-action
letters that have construed what activities encompass "regularity
of participation," one commentator states that such regularity is
necessary in order for one to be considered to be "engaged in the
business" of securities transactions. 4

69. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000). "[Tlransactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters
related thereto ....

"

Id.

70. See The Investor's Advocate, supra note 2 (providing history and
overview of SEC, including the SEC's mission).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2000).
72. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 910 (discussing the definition of "brokers").
73. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 909-10 & n.59 (quoting Mass. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 411 F. Supp 411, 415 (D. Mass. 1976),
affd, 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976)). In Massachusetts FinancialServices, the
court analyzed the definitions of broker and dealer in the context of whether or
not the plaintiffs brokerage activities fell within an exception to membership
in the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. 411 F. Supp. at 414. The
court stated that both statutory definitions of broker and dealer "connote a
certain regularity of participation in securities transactions at key points in
the chain of distribution." 411 F. Supp. at 415.
74. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 911-12. Among those activities are: (i)
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The SEC and courts analyze past and future experiences in
For
securities transactions when determining regularity.75
instance, an issuer is not considered a broker-dealer if it has not
offered or sold securities in the past and does not intend to in the
future apart from the present transaction."6 Conversely, if an
issuer was involved in similar offerings in the past and planned on
similar offerings in the future, that issuer is likely a regular77
participant in securities transactions and would have to register.
Finally, the offer and sale of securities does not have to be the
primary business of the broker-dealer in order to be "engaged in
the business." 8
Given these parameters, most courts would classify many
finders and intermediaries involved with private investment funds
to be broker-dealers. Some private investment intermediaries
participate in only one or two transactions, which make it likely
they would be exempt from registration.79 There are, however,
many other such intermediaries who are involved in more than
one such transaction, ° and many of them make such activities
their primary business, thereby clearly satisfying the "engaged in
the business" criterion. 8
"Effecting Transactions in Securities"
In addition to being regularly "engaged in the business," the
finder's or intermediary's activity must amount to "effecting
transactions in securities."' Courts identify several activities or
factors that may bring a finder or intermediary within this
These are all simply factors that the courts will
definition.'
b.

active solicitation of investors over several years; (ii) purchasing "several
million dollars' worth of securities"; (iii) advertising one's interest to engage in
a securities transaction for one's own account more than "on a single isolated

basis"; and (iv) holding oneself out as being willing to participate in securities
transactions. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 912.
79. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 960, 976 (providing background and

overview of finders and indicating that the SEC and most states view the
taking of a finder's fee for the introduction of capital on more than one
occasion as being "engaged in the business of selling securities for
compensation").

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 909-12 (discussing the definition of
brokers).
83. SEC v. Thorn, 426 F.3d 786, 797 (6th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Hansen, No. 83
Civ. 3692, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1984); SEC v.
Margolin, No. 92 Civ. 6307 (PKL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14872, at *15-16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992). Among the activities and factors identified by these
courts are: (i) being employed by the issuer of the securities; (ii) receiving
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examine when determining whether the defendant acted as a
broker-dealer. No particular combination of factors will qualify
one as a broker-dealer.
For example, in SEC v. Thorn,' one of the defendants argued
he was not an employee of the issuer and did not receive any
compensation for his services because the investment scheme
suffered a loss.' According to the court in that case, even if it
accepted these arguments, the defendant was still a broker-dealer
because he frequently communicated with and recruited investors
to purchase securities.'
Another court held the defendant corporation was a brokerdealer based on the number of investors solicited and the dollar
amount collected from those investors.87
In that case, the
defendant corporation's exclusive purpose was to take part in
trading programs, and it had solicited over forty investors who had
pledged to invest over $17.45 million, collecting over $1.7 million
from twelve of those investors.'
Transaction-based compensation seems to be an important
factor in determining whether broker-dealer registration is
required. The SEC has indicated that this factor is important in
determining whether one is acting as a broker-dealer because such
compensation can attract abusive sales techniques by unregistered
individuals.89 Based on court decisions, however, it is uncertain
whether this factor alone is enough to warrant registration. For
example, one court noted that a defendant's receipt of transactionbased compensation was especially important in holding that the
commission rather than a salary; (iii) having a history of selling securities for
other issuers; (iv) participating in several transactions for various clients; (v)
giving advice to investors; (vi) participating in negotiations between the
investors and issuer; (vii) actively recruiting investors; (viii) providing clearing
services for the trading of securities; (ix) being in possession of the securities

and funds of clients; and (x) actively, rather than passively, finding investors.
84. 426 F.3d at 797.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 798.
87. SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 1998).
88. Id.
89. Persons Deemed Not to Be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 20,943,
1984 SEC LEXIS 1585, at *14-15 (May 9, 1984) [hereinafter "1984 Safe
Harbor Release"]. In this release, the SEC explained why, under Rule 3a4-1,

an associated person may not receive transaction-based compensation. The
SEC stated, "the receipt of transaction-based compensation often indicates
that... [an associated person] is engaged in the business of effecting

transactions in securities," and may be used to determine whether such person
is in fact a broker. Id. at *16. The SEC also stated that investor protection
issues arise when transaction-based compensation is involved, including the
possibility of high-pressure sales tactics. Id. As well, the SEC indicated that
the prohibition against transaction-based compensation for associated persons
was to prevent compensation agreements that depend upon the successful
sales efforts of the associated persons. Id. at *15.
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defendant acted as an unregistered broker-dealer. ° In addition to
the transaction-based compensation, the defendant in that case
actively solicited investors and gave securities recommendations to
investors."
Most private investment intermediaries will have an
arrangement with the issuer to receive transaction-based
compensation rather than a flat finder's fee.92 Therefore, although
courts generally do not find such compensation to be the sole
determinant in holding a broker to be unregistered, the SEC hints
that such a compensation agreement may be enough to require
registration."
Finally, at least one district court decision suggests certain
intermediary activities, including assisting with securities
transactions among others, may fall outside the statutory
definition of a broker.94 That court stated that "businessmen (who
identify potential merger partners) and opportunists (who like to
take a small cut of a big transaction)" are not commonly regarded
as brokers.95
B.
1.

Exemptions in Broker-Dealerand Securities Law

Rule 3a4-1 Safe Harborfor Associated Personsof Issuers

The policy underlying the broker-dealer rules and regulations
of the Exchange Act and the various self-regulatory organizations
is to provide protection to investors by ensuring that registered
90. SEC v. Corp. Relations Group, Inc., No. 6:99-cv-1222-Orl-28KRS, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24925, at *58-59 (M.D. Fla., March 28, 2003).
91. Id.
92. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 960 (discussing background and
overview of finders in private offerings, including compensation of finders).
93. See 1984 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 89, at *15-16, and
accompanying text (discussing SEC's position on why transaction-based
compensation may trigger broker-dealer registration).
94. SEC v. M & A West, Inc., No. C-01-3376 VRW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22452, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal., June 20, 2005).
95. Id. at *27. In dismissing the SEC's motion for summary judgment, the
district court stated the SEC cited no authority showing the defendant's
actions amounted to "effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others." Id. at *25. In response to the district court's request for authority
showing the defendant's actions fell within the definition of a broker, the SEC
responded by relying on the statute. Id. The court rejected this argument
stating that relying on a "bare statutory definition without interpretive
authority" is not enough to find against the defendant. Id. at *27. The court
added that if there really is such a lack of authority regarding what
constitutes being a broker, then the SEC should provide further guidance by
promulgating rules beyond Rules 3a4-1 to 3a4-6. Id. at *28. While this case
does not offer much in the way of authority, it is interesting to note that this
particular district court is just as confused about the issue of unregistered
finders ("businessmen" and "opportunists" as the court calls them) and
whether they really should be classified as broker-dealers. Id. at *27.
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broker-dealers both possess the necessary training and are
obligated to conduct their business under certain prescribed
standards.'
The Rule 3a4-1 safe harbor codifies past SEC
interpretive advice and no-action letters concerning broker-dealer
registration requirements when an issuer intends to sell its
securities through its partners, officers, or employees rather than
hiring a registered broker-dealer. 7
This rule gives certain
associated persons of an issuer a safe harbor from the brokerdealer registration requirement.98
Under the safe harbor, unregistered principals in a private
investment firm cannot offer investment interests in a Fund more
than once in a twelve-month period without either registering as a
broker-dealer or hiring a registered broker-dealer.'
Further,
those principals are limited as to whom they may offer the
interests."°
Generally, a finder or intermediary will not fall
within the scope of the safe-harbor because he does not meet the
regulatory definition of an "associated person" and because he will
likely receive transaction-based compensation.'
A private
placement broker-dealer is likely to receive transaction-based
compensation rather than a flat fee,"0' thus disqualifying him from
the safe harbor even with no statutory disqualification or
association with a broker-dealer.
2.

The Finder'sExemption

The level of finding activity may have some bearing on
whether or not registration is required, such that if one's finding
activities are more than passive, registration may be required. °3
For example, one court identified "active and aggressive" activities
as one factor in ruling that an unregistered broker-dealer violated
the Exchange Act.'0 ' The court indicated the defendant was an
aggressive finder because of his combined "advertisements,

96. Persons Deemed Not to Be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 22,172,
1985 SEC LEXIS 1217, at *4 (June 27, 1985) [hereinafter "1985 Safe Harbor
Release"].

97. Id. at *3.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1; see also supra text accompanying note 57
(providing overview of safe-harbor rule).
99. 17 C.F.R. at § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(C).
100. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(i).
101. As noted, there are three primary requirements to qualify for the safeharbor: the associated person is not disqualified from participating by statute;

the associated person must not receive direct or indirect transaction-based
compensation; and the associated person must not be an associated person of a
broker-dealer. § 240.3a4-1(a).
102. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 960 (discussing background and

overview of finders in private offerings, including compensation of finders).
103. Hansen, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835, at *26-27.

104. Id.
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correspondence, and oil and gas development seminars." °5
Additionally, the defendant in that case received sales
commissions, 10 previously sold securities of another issuer, 7 and
often gave extensive advice to investors.0 8 According to that court,
those activities, combined with the "active and aggressive" finding
activities, amounted to broker activities under the Exchange
Act.o9
The SEC has addressed the registration requirements of
certain finders or intermediaries through no-action letters issued
on a case-by-case basis. Those letters set parameters similar to
those drawn in various courts' definitions of a broker-dealer.110
The parameters focus on whether the finder was involved in
negotiations, solicited investors, received transaction-based
compensation, gave advice, or participated in securities
transactions in the past. "'
C. The State Regulatory Regimes
Michigan is the only state with a registration system for
finders."'
The state defines a finder as "a person who, for
consideration, participates in the offer to sell, sale, or purchase of
securities or commodities by locating, introducing, or referring
potential purchasers or sellers.""3 Presently, Michigan's system
involves the finder registering as an investment advisor."' Other

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.

Id. at *26.
Id.

Id. at *27.
Id.

110. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 975 (summarizing various no-action
letters addressing the issue of finders and intermediaries).
111. Id. Namely, these parameters are: (i) was the intermediary involved in
negotiations; (ii) did the finder solicit investors; (iii) did the finder make
recommendations or engage in discussions with the prospective investor
regarding the nature of the securities; (iv) did the intermediary receive
transaction-based compensation; (v) was the intermediary previously involved
in other securities transactions; (vi) was the intermediary disciplined in the
past? Id.
112. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 451.801 (2005); see also ABA Report, supra note 9,
at 966 (discussing Michigan registration system for finders).
113. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.801.
114. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 451.502 (2005). As noted in the statute and
mentioned in the ABA Report, supra note 9, at 966 n.7, Michigan sets forth
certain obligations for finders. First, a finder who receives payment for his
finding services may not take possession of funds or securities in connection
with that transaction for which such payment is made. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 451.502. Second, before the sale or purchase of any securities, the finder
must, "clearly and conspicuously" disclose in writing to everyone involved in
the transaction that he is acting as a finder. Id. The finder must also disclose
any payment received for his services as a finder, including the amount and
method of payment. Id.
Further, the finder must disclose any beneficial
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states allow registration of agents of an issuer that sell securities
in private placements.1
D. The SuitabilityDoctrine and Accredited Investors
With respect to accredited investors, the NASD's position is
that the investor's assets alone do not satisfy the broker-dealer's
suitability responsibilities under the NASD's suitability Rule
2310.116 Yet, the NASD has hinted that accredited investors do
have some level of sophistication." 7
However, this may not
interest in the issue of the subject securities, whether indirect or direct, of
either the finder or a member of his immediate family. Id. Third, a finder
may not take part in the offer, purchase, or sale of a security that would
violate the security registration requirements of the Michigan Uniform
Securities Act § 451.301. Id. If, however, the finder has no knowledge that
the proposed transaction would violate § 451.301 after making a reasonable
effort to determine either if a registration had been made or whether an
exemption has been claimed or granted, then the finder may proceed. Id.
Fourth, before participating in a transaction, the finder must acquire
information regarding (a) the risks involved in the transaction, (b) the direct
and indirect compensation of the principals and their affiliates, (c) the issuer's
financial condition, and (d) how the proceeds will be used. Id. However, no
independent investigation or alteration of the offering materials provided to
the finder is required. Id. Fifth, the finder must, until the end of the
particular transaction, provide disclosure of any material information that the
finder knows or should know is material in one making an investment decision
to all persons found by him. Id. Sixth, the finder may only locate, introduce,
and refer individuals who are suitable investors based on their "financial
condition, age, experience, or need to diversify investments." Id. Finally,
there is no requirement that the finder independently generate information.
Id.
115. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 966 n.6 (noting certain states register
placement agents rather than finders); see also 950 MASS. CODE REGS.
§ 12.202(3) (2005) (setting forth procedures for issuer-agent registration).
116. See Mills & Holinsky, supra note 50, at 6-20 (discussing the customerspecific suitability requirements for broker-dealers when recommending hedge
funds to customers); see also, National Association of Securities Dealers,
NASD Notice to Members: NASD Recommends Best Practices for Reviewing
New Products, Apr. 2005, 2005 NASD LEXIS 7, *16 ("NASD cautions that
there is no substitute for a suitability analysis, and 'accredited' status under
Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 is not necessarily an indicator of
sophistication, particularly if the value of the investor's home constitutes a
significant percentage of his or her net wealth."); National Association of
Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members: NASD Reminds Members of
Obligations When Selling Hedge Funds, Feb. 2003, 2003 NASD LEXIS 3, *10
(stating that an investor's level of assets is not the sole criteria upon which to
base a suitability determination).
117. National Association of Securities Dealers, Special NASD Notice to
Members: NASD Regulation Requests Comment On Proposal To Adopt
Recommendation And Disclosure Rules For Over-The-Counter (OTC) Equity
Securities; Comment Period Expires February 16, 1998, Jan. 1998, 1998
NASD LEXIS 17, *13 (discussing proposed rules for OTC securities, the NASD
stated that the proposed rule would not apply to transactions exempt under
§ 4(2) of the Securities Act). The NASD stated that "[tihese transactions are
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necessarily mean that sophisticated investors can make their own
suitability determinations.
The SEC's 1984 Safe Harbor Release solicited comments
regarding whether the then proposed Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(i)(A) should
include sales to accredited investors.118 Following that, the SEC's
1985 Safe Harbor Release noted that some commentators felt that
accredited investors have the capability to require issuers to make
full disclosures about the offering, and such investors can protect
themselves from possible sales pressures from the issuer's
employees. "9
But the SEC ultimately excluded accredited
investors from the final rule. The SEC reasoned that the ability of
some accredited investors to transact business without the
protections provided by registration under the Securities Act does
not mean "that a broad exemption from broker-dealer registration
is appropriate.""' The SEC also stated that the existing rules
under the Exchange Act and the self-regulatory organizations are
"no less important" in the context of accredited investors than they
are in others. 121
1.

SophisticatedInvestors

With the exception of the definition of an accredited
investor, 2' there is little mention of sophisticated investors in the
securities laws."n Courts do, however, make a distinction between

sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.'

For instance, in

excluded from the scope of the proposed rule since they are deemed either
transactions not involving a public offering or transactions generally involving
certain qualified or sophisticated investors (i.e., accredited investors)." Id.
118. 1984 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 89, at *17. According to this
Release, the proposed Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(i)(A) stated that an associated person
would not be deemed a broker if sales were restricted to certain financial
institutions and intermediaries, such as registered broker-dealers, registered
investment companies, banks, insurance companies, etc.
Id.
These
institutions and intermediaries were included because of their financial
sophistication. Id.
119. 1985 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 96, at *17-18.
120. Id. at*18.
121. Id. The only reference to any specific rules was to those that "ensure
adequate supervision."
Presumably, this relates back to ensuring an
unregistered broker-dealer does not subject the investor to high-pressure sales
tactics.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 37
(discussing regulatory definition of "accredited investor").
123. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, SophisticatedInvestors Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1083 (1988) (noting that although there
is little mention of sophisticated investors in the securities laws, the courts do
make a distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors).
124. Id. Unfortunately, courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of
sophisticated investors. Id. at 1085.
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deciding Rule 10b-5' 5 cases involving fraud and deceit, courts take
various approaches in determining whether there is a connection
between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's conduct.'26
Regardless of the approach taken, the sophistication of the
investor is an issue.'
In a Rule 10b-5 case, courts look at an
investor's "background, education, special expertise, and general
investment sophistication" in determining whether the investor
reasonably relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations." 8
Sophisticated investors face higher standards in determining
reliance, which makes it more difficult for them to show causation
in Rule 10b-5 cases. 129
2.

Pre-existingRelationship between Intermediary and Investor

As set forth in the State of New York's Policy Statement
101" 6 and Policy Statement 105,31 New York allows for certain
exemptions to the registration of securities offerings when those
offerings, inter alia, involve persons with whom the issuer has a
pre-existing relationship. 21 Notwithstanding the separate brokerdealer registration and notice requirements in New York, these
exemptions, involving investors with a pre-existing relationship to
the issuer, indicate that such a relationship is a factor in
determining certain exemptions to registration of the offering.2
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). This is the rule prohibiting fraud and
deceit.
126. See Fletcher, supra note 123, at 1086 (discussing investor sophistication
and the causation requirement of Rule 10b-5).
127. See id. at 1085-86 (pointing to the difficulty of developing a prima facie
case under
Rule
10b-5).
For example,
in cases
representing
misrepresentations of fact, courts often decide causation by determining
whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's misstatements. Id.
at 1087. In determining reasonable reliance, the plaintiffs sophistication is
relevant, and his sophistication may show unjustifiable reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations. Id. at 1088.
128. Id. at 1088.
129. Id. at 1089-1090.
130. See infra note 132.
131. See infra note 132.
132. See, e.g., Policy Statement 105, Instructions for Issuers of Real Estate
Syndication Offerings Requesting No-Filing Letters from the Attorney
General, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/realestate/policy/psl05.html
(providing instructions for issuers offering real estate interests who wish to
obtain a no-filing letter); Policy Statement 101, Exemption Application Under
§ 352-g(1) and § 359-f(2) of the General Business Law for Real Estate
Syndication Offerings Made to Persons Not Exceeding Forty in Number,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/realestatepolicy/pslOl.html (providing
instructions for issuers of real estate syndication offerings that certain
exemptions for offerings limited to forty or less investors).
133. Policy Statement 105 sets forth six no-filing categories in which the
attorney general will take no action in response to an issuer of real estate
interests' failure to file an offering statement. Policy Statement 105, supra
note 132. For example, Policy Statement 105 provides an exemption for small
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Further, Policy Statement 101 and Policy Statement 105 both
state that accredited investors (as defined by Rule 501 of
Regulation D) are automatically assumed to be sophisticated
investors. 3"
This indicates that, with respect to certain
sophisticated investors with whom the issuer has a pre-existing
relationship, less formality is required with the disclosure and
registration requirements of New York's securities laws.
Given the findings set forth above,' it is evident that most
private placement intermediaries would likely be required to
register as broker-dealers even though the finding activity is not
their primary business and even though they deal exclusively with
sophisticated, accredited investors. But given the findings of the
ABA Report,"' as well as the comments of at least one court, 1" the

private offerings, which the Statement defines as "one in which sales are made
to nine or fewer investors within and without the State of New York who are
sophisticated, have sufficient means for the investment and have a preexisting relationship with the promoters of the offering." Policy Statement
105, supra note 132.
There is also an exemption for isolated sales made to no more than two
New York residents who: (i) are "sophisticated"; (ii) "have sufficient means for
the investment"; and, (iii) "have a pre-existing relationship with the promoters
of the offering." Policy Statement 101, supra note 132. A "pre-existing
relationship" is defined in Policy Statement 105 as either a close familial or a
"significant business or social relationship" of a year or more between the
investor and a principal of the issuer. Policy Statement 105, supra note 132.
Policy Statement 101 adds that the existing relationship must be direct; that
is, it cannot be through a broker, investment advisor, accountant, or lawyer of
either party. Policy Statement 101, supra note 132.
134. Policy Statement 101, supra note 132; Policy Statement 105, supra note
132. In addition to the presumption for accredited investors, the policy
statements define sophisticated investors as those having "experience in real
estate investments, investments in securities or other substantial business or
financial experience, or a person having .a personal advisor with such
experience." Policy Statement 105, supra note 132.
The personal advisor cannot be a principal of the issuer nor receive
commissions from the issuer based on the sale to the investor. Policy
Statement 105, supra note 132. Policy Statement 101 adds that the personal
advisor, in addition to commissions, cannot receive "other compensation from
the issuer or its principals for the organization of or sale of interests in the
issuer." Policy Statement 101, supra note 132.
This begs the question: may an intermediary who has a pre-existing
relationship with a sophisticated, accredited investor introduce that investor
to the issuer and, should the investor invest, may the intermediary receive
payment based on that investment?
135. See supra text accompanying notes 72-121.
136. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 961 (proposing recommendations "to
bridge the gap between the current regulatory system and a system better
targeted at the unregistered financial intermediaries").
137. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (finding that the Northern
District of California deems some intermediary actions outside the current
definition of broker).
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current regime does not fit these particular transactions. Finally,
the proposals offered by the ABA Report do not address either

private investment funds or how the suitability doctrine fits
within the new regime."1

IV. PROPOSAL
In light of the foregoing analysis and the ABA Report, 3 ' this
Comment proposes a relaxed regulatory regime that takes into
account the suitability doctrine imposed by the NASD and implicit
This new regime will allow private
in the Exchange Act.
placement broker-dealers to introduce accredited investors to
issuers and receive payment based on that transaction. It will also
set forth certain due diligence requirements, including restrictions
upon private placement broker-dealers who have a pre-existing
relationship with sophisticated, accredited investors. Finally, it
will propose a limited registration exemption for private
placement broker-dealers who deal with only one transaction per
year.
A. PrivateInvestment Fund PrivatePlacement Broker-Dealer:
NASD Membership & Limited Registrations
The SEC should promulgate rules under Section 15 of the
Exchange Act 4 ° setting forth a definition for "private placement
broker-dealers" and the requirements for registration. 141
Additionally, the SEC should require NASD membership for
private placement broker-dealers.
Given the growth of
enforcement activity by the SROs, it seems reasonable for the SEC
to confer upon the NASD certain rulemaking and enforcement
responsibilities with respect to private placement brokerdealers. 142
138. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 961 (addressing private placement
broker relationships).
139. See id. (making recommendations for private placement brokerdealers).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2000).

141. Given the SEC's interpretation of the statutory definition of "broker," it
seems unlikely and unnecessary for Congress to amend the Exchange Act to
differentiate between "full-service" brokers and "private placement" brokers.
Rather, both should fall within the Exchange Act's definition. The rules
promulgated under that definition should set forth the distinctions between
the two, as well as the qualifications and responsibilities of each.
142. In addition to the growth of SRO enforcement, the Exchange Act
requires SROs to implement rules that cover nearly all facets of the securities
industry. See Richard D. Marshall & Sean E. Kreiger, SEC and SRO
Enforcement, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 24-4 to -5, 24-19, supra note 50
(discussing the role of SROs).
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The NASD should set forth certain rules for limited
registrations based on the type and scope of activities of the
private placement broker-dealer. For example, while an entity or
individual may qualify to be a private placement broker-dealer, in
order to engage in certain securities transactions, that entity or
individual must register as a specific type of private placement
broker-dealer. Thus, there should be limited registrations for
private placement broker-dealers engaging primarily in capitalraising for start-up companies, mergers and acquisitions, private
investment funds, and other private offerings.
This limited
registration system would be similar to the "Limited
Representative" subcategories of NASD Rule 1032.24
B. Characteristicsof a Private Investment Fund Private
Placement Broker-Dealer
1.

Deals Only With PrivateInvestment Funds
"Private investment fund private placement broker-dealers,"
as their title suggests, would engage in securities transactions
involving only private investment funds.'" Although finders and
intermediaries may perform securities-related services in other
areas, such as raising capital for start-up companies or pooling
merger and acquisition candidates, given the varied nature of
these transactions, it seems appropriate to differentiate among
them using a limited registration. 45
The question remains whether there should be a cap on either
the dollar amount of an offering in which a private placement
broker-dealer may be involved, or a cap on the amount of
investment by the investor or investors that the private placement
broker-dealer brought to the issuer. On one hand, given that fullservice broker-dealers generally do not handle deals under twenty143. NASD Rule 1032 requires persons associated with broker-dealers 'to
register with the Association as a General Securities Representative and shall
pass an appropriate Qualification Examination before such registration may
become effective unless his activities are so limited as to qualify him for one or
more of the limited categories of representative registration specified
hereafter." NASD Manual, supra note 53, § 1032.
144. The NASD should define the term "private investment fund." The
definition should be broad enough to cover all of the commonly used funds.
See SCHELL, supra note 28, at 1-8 and accompanying text (setting forth
common categories of private investment funds). The Author's suggested
definition for "private investment fund" is "a pooled investment vehicle
through which accredited investors and the fund's principals contractually
agree on certain investment objectives." See id.
145. Under this proposal, a private placement broker-dealer may obtain
limited registrations for more than one category. Thus, if a private placement
broker-dealer is qualified to engage in both private investment funds and
start-up companies, then that private placement broker-dealer could obtain
limited registrations for both.
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five million dollars,'4 it seems that private placement brokerdealers should be involved with offerings up to this amount. 14'7 A
more plausible solution, however, would be to either set a cap on
the amount of money an investor introduced by a private
placement broker-dealer may bring to the offering, or perhaps
limit the number of investors brought to the issuer by a private
placement broker-dealer. "
2. Accredited, SophisticatedInvestors Only
Generally, private investment funds only sell interests to
accredited investors. 9 Notwithstanding this practice, the new
rule should specifically restrict registered private placement
broker-dealers to dealing with accredited investors only, as defined
by the SEC."5 Congress and the SEC previously determined that
certain sophisticated and wealthy investors do not require the
same level of regulation as average investors.'
Additionally,
146. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 968 (discussing findings from ABA
Report that most full-service broker-dealers do not get involved with private
offerings under twenty-five million dollars).
147. If the proposed rule allows private placement broker-dealers to
participate in offerings up to an unlimited dollar amount, at some point they
will intrude on the turf of full-service broker-dealers. This will certainly bring
protest from the fully regulated broker-dealers. Yet, the amount of the
offering should not make a difference if the private offering involves accredited
and sophisticated investors. Although the stakes are higher, the duties and
responsibilities of either a private placement broker-dealer or a full-service
broker-dealer remain the same.
148. For example, a private placement broker-dealer might be limited to the
greater of either fifteen investors or a total of thirty million dollars in
individual investments.
149. SCHELL, supra note 28, at 8-7.
150. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (defining "accredited investor"); see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 501's definition of "accredited
investor" as it pertains to private offerings under Regulation D).
151. See, e.g., supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing definitions in
Regulation D); see also Defining "Qualified Purchaser" Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 33-8041, 66 Fed. Reg. 66839, at 8-9
(Dec. 19, 2001) (proposing a definition of the term "qualified purchaser" under
the Exchange Act in order to apply a provision of the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA")). The SEC proposed that the
term "qualified purchaser" have the same meaning as the term "accredited
investor" under Rule 501. Id. at 8. In the release, the SEC stated, "the
regulatory and legislative history of both terms are based upon similar notions
of the financial sophistication of investors, and accredited investor is a longstanding concept familiar to the small business community and other industry
participants." Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted). The release also noted the
"[SEC's] considerable regulatory experience with the use of the term
'accredited investor' leads [it] to believe it strikes the appropriate balance
between the necessity for investor protection and meaningful relief for issuers
offering securities, especially small businesses." Id. at 9. The SEC also stated
that Congress considered "accredited persons as sophisticated and able to
protect their financial interests without regulatory assistance." Id. at 9 n.20.
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courts hold sophisticated investors to a higher standard in
securities fraud cases.'52 Therefore, while the accredited investors
brought to an issuer by a private placement broker-dealer still
receive protection under the Exchange Act, courts assume that
these investors have greater investment sophistication and thus
should bear a heightened burden when pursuing fraud cases
against private placement broker-dealers.'53
3. Suitability
The NASD should set forth specific suitability" requirements
The NASD's current
for private-placement broker-dealers.
suitability rule'55 contemplates full-service broker-dealers dealing
with ongoing relations with their customers. Therefore, the NASD
should implement a new suitability rule specifically tailored for
the limited role of private placement broker-dealers.
4. No or Very Limited Involvement in Negotiations.
Private placement broker-dealers generally act more like
finders" 6 than like traditional broker-dealers." ' That is, most
private placement broker-dealers introduce the investor to the
issuer and receive payment based on that investor's investment.
The private placement broker-dealer leaves the negotiation to the
issuer and the investor, or their respective attorneys. Therefore,

However, the term "accredited investor" is used in connection with exemptions
to registration of securities offerings under the Securities Act. See supra notes
35-38 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation D). The Exchange Act
does not exempt a broker-dealer's responsibilities because an investor is
accredited. See supra Part III(D) (discussing comments from the SEC in the
1984 Safe Harbor Release stating that exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act does not equate to exemption from the
protective provisions of the Exchange Act).
152. See discussion supra Section III(D)(1) and text accompanying notes 123132 (discussing sophisticated investors in securities fraud cases and the
various standards to which courts hold them).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; supra notes 116-121 and
accompanying text (discussing and analyzing suitability doctrine).
155. See NASD Manual, supra note 53, § 2310 (discussing NASD suitability
rule).
156. See discussion supra Section II(D)(2) and text accompanying notes 6468 (providing background regarding finders in the securities industry); see also
discussion supra Section III(B)(2) and text accompanying notes 103-111
(analyzing administrative and court decisions and scholarship regarding
finders).
157. See discussion supra Section II(C)(1) and text accompanying notes 4144 (providing background regarding definition of broker-dealers); see also
discussion supra Section III(A) and text accompanying notes 69-93 (analyzing
court and administrative decisions and scholarly materials regarding the
definition of broker).
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the scope of traditional "broker" activity" undertaken by the
private placement broker-dealer should remain very limited and
involve very little in the way of negotiation.
C. The Exchange Act, NASD Rules, and Suitability Doctrine
Legitimize the ProposedPrivatePlacement Broker-DealerRule
Essentially, the proposed private placement broker-dealer
rule allows the private-placement broker-dealer to legitimately
engage in traditional finder'59 activities and receive transactionbased compensation for those activities. The Exchange Act and
NASD rules further legitimize this rule because they would
require the private placement broker-dealer to introduce to the
investor only those Funds that are suitable to that investor.
Furthermore, in keeping with the mission of the federal securities
laws and the SEC, the proposed rule protects investors because,
under the new rule, private placement broker-dealers will be
regulated and subject to discipline.
D. Limited Exception for CertainDefined Findersor
Intermediaries
Finally, the SEC should promulgate a rule under which
private placement broker-dealers, finders, or intermediaries
involved in a single transaction per year are not required to
register. The individual claiming the exemption would be very
limited in the scope of his or her activities. First, the offering
must qualify under the proposed "private placement brokerdealer" rules. Second, the investor brought to the issuer would
have to be both accredited and sophisticated, as the SEC chooses
to define such terms. 6 ° Third, the investor must have a preexisting relationship with the private placement broker-dealer. 6'
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68 (regarding the traditional
activities of finders).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506;

17 C.F.R. § 230.501; see also supra text

accompanying notes 35-37 (regarding Regulation D and accredited investors);
supra text accompanying notes 122-129 (discussing sophisticated investors).

The SEC should define the term "sophisticated investor" as it would relate to
this exemption.

One commentator suggests there are certain relevant criteria in
determining who is a sophisticated investor. Fletcher, supra note 123, at

1149-55. Professor Fletcher explains these criteria apply to almost every case
involving an analysis of whether an investor was sophisticated. Id. These
criteria are: "(1) financial and business acumen, (2) individual characteristics

of sophistication, and (3) investment-specific behavior." Id. Professor Fletcher
sets forth a checklist of considerations under each of the aforementioned
categories that are relevant in making a sophistication determination. Id.

161. See discussion supra Section III(D)(2) and text accompanying notes 132134 (discussing New York's definition of "pre-existing relationship"). The New
York definition of "pre-existing relationship" is a good starting point. It would
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If a private placement broker-dealer or finder meets this
exception, he or she should be entitled to receive transaction-based
compensation based on that isolated transaction without having to
register.
V.

CONCLUSION

62
One of the SEC's primary missions is to protect investors.
However, fully regulated broker-dealers are not providing their
services to certain smaller issuers." As a result, smaller issuers
are seeking the assistance from finders and intermediaries to help
Rather than deal with this problem on an ad hoc
raise capital.'
basis through no-action letters, the SEC should promulgate a new
rule under the Exchange Act that provides for limited registration
for private placement broker-dealers. Additionally, it should set
forth a rule exempting certain persons involved in only one
transaction per year. These new rules would clarify the definition
of "broker-dealer" under the Exchange Act, and bring into
compliance many who are arguably engaging in unregistered
broker-dealer activities. This would be consistent with the SEC's
mission of investor protection and preserving the integrity of the
securities markets.

essentially codify the relationship many finders already have with the
investors they bring to Funds. Namely, many of these finders and investors
are businesspersons and colleagues who have done business with each other in
the past and, based on these past transactions, would likely know enough
about each other professionally to make a suitability determination.
162. See The Investor's Advocate, supra note 2 (discussing purpose and
mission of the SEC and the securities laws).
163. ABA Report, supra note 9, at 968.
164. See supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing finders and
intermediaries in the capital markets).

